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Rapidly expanding unmanned air traffic includes and will continue to include non-
cooperative participants. Non-cooperative behavior may be due to technical failure, a lack of 
appropriate equipment, a careless or malicious operator. Regardless of the cause, the 
outcome remains: growing density of non-cooperative traffic will increase the risk of 
collision between unmanned vehicles and aircraft carrying humans. As a result, the 
degraded safety of airspace may limit access to airspace, with adverse consequences for the 
traveling public and the economy. Because encounters with small non-cooperative objects, 
such as birds or wayward drones, can happen too rapidly for an external control system to 
mitigate them, it is imperative that the aircraft that carry humans survive encounters with 
non-cooperative vehicles. To-date, design for survivability has been practiced explicitly in 
the military domain. Survivability against collisions in civil aviation has been limited to 
tolerances against bird strikes; and these tolerances have proved inadequate on occasion. 
The growing risk of collision with unmanned vehicles now requires the development of 
survivability discipline for civilian transport aircraft. The new discipline must be infused 
into multidisciplinary design methods, on par with traditional disciplines. In this paper, we 
report on a preliminary study of survivability considerations for the civil aviation domain.  
Nomenclature 
PS = survivability (probability of survival) 
PNS = non-survivability (probability of non-survival) 
PH = susceptibility (probability of collision or being hit) 
PNS|H = vulnerability (probability of non-survival on being hit) 
I. Introduction 
arious efforts are underway to ensure the safety of the air transportation system in the face of changing 
airspace, in particular, the eventual, and possibly imminent, presence of large numbers of highly heterogeneous 
vehicles, including autonomous aircraft and Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS). For instance, different operation 
domains at different altitudes may be used for UAS. Dedicated low-altitude “drone highways” in the sky have been 
proposed by Amazon for their Prime Air delivery
3
. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is partnering with 
industry associations to promote safe use of UAS
4
. Geofencing is being considered for separating various domains 
in airspace and on the ground
5
. 
    These and other efforts will likely safeguard operations of a large portion of airspace. However, these measures 
rely on voluntary cooperation of all participants and a certain minimum level of functioning equipage. Whereas, 
arguably, the majority of the airspace participants will exhibit cooperative behavior, some autonomous participants 
will not. In fact, non-cooperative aircraft are already here. Drones interfering with firefighting efforts in California 
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in July 2015 are one well-known example of non-cooperative behavior with serious consequences
6
. The problem of 
non-cooperative behavior, whether reckless or malicious or simply uninformed, will be exacerbated with growing 
air traffic density. The FAA had expected nearly a million UAS to be sold during the 2015 holiday season alone
7
. 
Per recent headlines, “Reports of errant drones flouting U.S. regulations including flying too close to passenger 
airliners and other aircraft surged late last year to an average of four incidents per day, according to FAA data” and  
“Drone Close Calls, Sightings by Airliners Up Fivefold”8. 
     At the time this paper is written, civilian UAS are still relatively small, light, and primitive. They fly short 
distances, at low altitudes, and are not robust with respect to weather. However, even light UAS have a hard 
component – the battery, which can present danger to such areas of a large aircraft as the fuel-bearing part of the 
wing. Moreover, given the low cost of technology, the size and performance of UAS will ramp up quickly. Hence, 
non-cooperative behavior, whether unwitting or intentional, will present an ever growing danger to aircraft carrying 
passengers,
9
 as availability of UAS and density of UAS traffic increase. 
 This situation necessitates a clean-slate consideration of survivability and self-preservation of a benign aircraft in 
the presence of dense autonomous and unmanned traffic. Traditionally, full-blown survivability has been a concern 
of the military domain. Civilian aircraft design has dealt with a more limited set of survivability issues, such as the 
impact of bird strikes, weather, fire, and mechanical failure. Danger from collisions with other aircraft has been 
prevented via a set of appropriate separation bounds within regulated airspace, with information and directions 
provided by the external air traffic control system and some on-board equipment. The changing nature of the 
vehicles populating the airspace means that civilian aircraft design must now explicitly include considerations of 
survivability in the event of collision with other vehicles.   
 One of the salient features of encounters with non-cooperative objects is the extremely short time line of the 
event. For instance, during the “Miracle-on-the-Hudson” incident (15 January 2009, US Airways Flight 1549), only 
1.5 seconds elapsed between the pilots noticing the flock of birds and the bird strikes that ultimately downed the 
aircraft. Neither an external air traffic control system, nor the human pilots, nor (at present) the aircraft control 
system can take protective action at such time scales. Ensuring the safety of humans on an aircraft necessitates 
detecting (sensing and perception) a non-cooperative UAS automatically, making an autonomous, machine decision, 
and implementing it, all in time for the aircraft systems’ actions to weaken the collision and mitigate its 
consequences.  
 This work deals with survivability during potential encounters of aircraft carrying humans (pilots or pilots and 
passengers) with non-cooperative aircraft, where collision has not been prevented by the Traffic Alert and Collision 
Avoidance System (TCAS) or its likely successor, the Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS X), and is 
imminent. In the following sections, we give some preliminary observations on survivability in civil aviation; 
lessons learned from design for aircraft survivability in the military domain; and the applicability of these design 
principles to civil aviation. We then propose a path toward developing a survivability discipline for aircraft carrying 
humans in an airspace that includes non-cooperative participants.   
II. Preliminary Investigation 
This study started with a qualitative consideration of various aspects of vehicle operation that impact 
survivability. Because flocking birds present a known threat to civilian aircraft, we collected information on the 
physics of bird strikes, to serve as a surrogate model of non-cooperative UAS. 
A. Birds and Engines 
Canada geese are a common threat due to their weight (a male from 8.41 to 9.23 pounds; a female from 7.31 to 
7.75 pounds), flocking behavior, attraction to grazing sites at airports, and the year-round presence of their resident 
populations. Only fourteen North American bird species are at least as large as a Canada goose.  
Roughly 50% of all bird strikes involve the aircraft engine, and engine certifications require designing and 
planning for operations after bird strikes occur. A “large flocking bird” requirement was added in 2007 that 
stipulated that the engine must function at a specified decreased performance after ingesting a 5.0 pound bird. It has 
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since been determined that the bird-ingestion design case is not defined by the highest kinetic energy case, but rather 
by the lowest operating speed. At the lowest operating speed, comparatively larger pieces of a bird will cause more 
damage to the engine core. Such certification requirements would not address the ingestion of a heavier drone. 
Moreover, despite the bird ingestion requirements, birds have downed aircraft, pointing to the ad hoc nature of such 
requirements and the difficulty of encompassing every bird strike situation in the requirements.  
B. Agility and Evasive Maneuvers 
In January of 2009 a twin-engine aircraft encountered a flock of Canada geese shortly after takeoff. Power was 
lost in both engines and the pilot glided to a safe landing on the Hudson River. A review of the NTSB investigation 
and the event timeline provided detailed information about the flight. The aircraft was operating at an altitude of 
2818 feet above ground level at a speed of about 246 mph around the time of the incident. The cockpit voice 
recorder indicated that both pilots saw the birds, but impact occurred one second later. 
 
15:27:10.4  HOT-1  birds.   
15:27:11   HOT-2  whoa.   
15:27:11.4  CAM  [sound of thump/thud(s) followed by shuddering 
sound]   
15:27:12   HOT-2  oh #. 
   
Reacting to such a threat in such short time would be difficult for any 
piloting system, but response might be possible if sensors provided additional 
reaction time. A Boeing source
10
 warns pilots: “Below 2,000 feet, climb at the 
maximum rate to reduce the flight time exposure to a strike hazard” and 
“Avoid or minimize maneuvering at low altitudes to avoid birds”. Rapid 
maneuverability to avoid unregulated UAS may not be acceptable as a regular 
occurrence on a civilian aircraft, even if proven to be structurally and 
mechanically feasible, due to physiological constraints on acceptability of 
maneuvers to passengers. Survivability in the presence of a few birds (or 
drones) may not require sharp maneuvering; slight changes in the path to 
weaken collisions with critical sections of the aircraft may suffice, if 
supported by appropriate automation. Large flocks of birds or drones present a more difficult challenge and may 
necessitate adding structural features and countermeasures that disable impending threats.  
C. Structural Enhancements 
According to Wikipedia, the average weight of a female bald eagle is 12 pounds. An impact of a soaring bald 
eagle on an airplane climbing at 200 mph would yield the kinetic energy of a 1,000-pound weight dropped from a 
height of 16 feet. The aftermath of a collision between a bald eagle and a military aircraft, depicted in Figure 1, 
underscores that structural enhancements may not present a viable design option for even moderate rest weights of a 
colliding object. Although adequate structural enhancements in the form of ruggedized structure, or armor, may be 
prohibitive in terms of performance and cost impact, other structural measures, such as re-arrangement of critical 
components may be considered.  
D. Countermeasures 
Recent news (e.g., Aviation Week
11
) indicates that the FAA and other U.S. and international considerations may 
evaluate UAS countermeasures at airports. Such systems would include passive and active electronic 
countermeasures to identify and disable UAS, with possible means of taking control of the UAS and tracking the 
UAS owners. Lasers and mechanical devices appear in the news as well. While to-date we have not seen an 
announcement of a viable device for an aircraft, capable of operating at appropriate speeds, the approach is certainly 
plausible for an airborne countermeasure, in principle. 
E. Observations 
Of course, detecting danger and avoiding collisions is much preferable to attempting recovery following a 
collision. Therefore, detect-and-avoid capabilities are in continual development. However, given the difficulty of 
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detection and avoidance under the complex conditions of a realistic and dense environment, it is impossible, in 
principle, to prove that detect-and-avoid capabilities will prevent a certain amount of safety degradation in airspace, 
at least in the foreseeable future. Therefore, an aircraft carrying passengers requires explicit survivability 
enhancements, to maintain passenger safety.   
Aside from simply adding armor, which is the least desirable option because of the inevitable loss of 
performance via increased weight, every other survivability measure (maneuvers, control, component and function 
health monitoring, self-healing, and so on) will require the development of autonomous artificial intelligence 
systems, simply because humans are incapable of reacting on the timescales necessary to assess and mitigate certain 
types of collisions, especially those involving several threats at close range.   
III. Applicability of the Survivability Approach from the Military Domain 
Survivability in the military domain deals with combat survivability and is defined as the capability to withstand 
a human-made hostile environment. Vast public domain literature on military aircraft survivability provides details 
(see, e.g., [1-25]) of survivability components.  Major differences in the physical attributes of the military and 
civilian aircraft (e.g., structural toughness, agility, and armament), as well as the quality of threats and dissimilar 
loss tolerances, do not allow for a one-to-one conversion of the military survivability techniques to civil aviation. 
However, there are a number of fundamental principles that can be adapted for application to civilian vehicle design 
and countermeasures. 
F. Measuring Survivability  
In an excellent reference [1], R.E. Ball, provides a probabilistic framework for defining and estimating 
survivability of a military aircraft. The conceptual framework can be adapted, in part, as an overall scheme for 
estimating civilian aircraft survivability.  
Survivability is measured as the probability of survival, 𝑃𝑆, and is viewed as complementary to killability. 
Survivability and killability are mutually exclusive and form a complete (exhaustive) system in the military domain. 
However, killability is interpreted in the general sense that includes an inability to complete a mission. In the 
civilian domain, we must use a more explicit measure – non-survivability, 𝑃𝑁𝑆, because the primary mission of the 
aircraft is to deliver humans on board to the ground safely. Not fulfilling the mission of getting to the original 
destination as a result of a collision is still within the bounds of survivability if the humans on board survived. Thus, 
 
𝑃𝑆 = 1 − 𝑃𝑁𝑆 
 
Non-survivability depends on the susceptibility of the aircraft and its vulnerability. Susceptibility, 𝑃𝐻 , is the 
probabaility of being hit. Vulnerability, 𝑃𝑁𝑆|𝐻, is the probability of the hit being fatal, i.e., the conditional probability 
of not surviving on being hit. Thus, 
 
𝑃𝑆 = 1 −  𝑃𝑁𝑆 = 1 −  𝑃𝐻𝑃𝑁𝑆|𝐻 
 
This simply quantifies survival as either not being hit or, if hit, not crashing.  
The probabilities can be further decomposed, based on specific scenarios and events. The quantification of 
probabilities in the military domain is done via construction of scenarios, event tree diagrams, simulations, and tests.  
Improving 𝑃𝑆 requires reductions in susceptibility and vulnerability.  
 
1. Susceptibility  
Susceptibility differs significantly between the military and civilian domains. Encountering a non-cooperative 
drone in civilian airspace would likely be a random event, whose probability would depend on the density and 
attributes of traffic at specific altitudes, with rare exceptions of malicious participants. The ability to detect danger in 
time for evading it or employing a countermeasure, in any domain, is preferable to design-in survivability features 
that involve vehicle shape, weight and therefore cost. Given the probable randomness of the non-cooperative 
encounters in civilian airspace, a careful investigation of fundamental capabilities of the present and anticipated 
detection, autonomous decision making and avoidance capabilities are in order to arrive at requirements and trade-
offs for design-in features vs. operational actions and countermeasures. 
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2. Vulnerability  
Because of the randomness factor in non-cooperative encounters, arguably, vulnerability reduction should be the 
emphasis of survivability improvement in civil aviation. 
The current approach to arriving at specific measures is complex. An aircraft is composed of a multitude of 
components, the vulnerability of each contributing to the vulnerability of the aircraft. Vulnerability reduction is 
performed via three main stages: identification of the critical components and their damage modes; vulnerability 
assessment; and design for low vulnerability.  
The first stage is extremely complicated and depends on the detailed technical description of a specific aircraft. 
The second stage depends, in addition, on the properties of the threat. The final stage relies on heuristically proposed 
measures and trade studies to determine relative merits of the proposed solutions. Solutions are based on a number 
of general principles:  
 Critical component redundancy with separation. E.g., multiple engines, control surfaces. 
 Critical component location. Prevent cascading damage. 
 Passive damage suppression. Fault tolerant design. 
 Active damage suppression. E.g., fire detection and suppression. 
 Critical component shielding. Shield by other components or additional structure.  
 Critical component elimination. E.g., replacing the pilot with automation.  
G. Observations  
While many features of the approach to reducing vulnerability can be adopted for civilian aircraft use, the 
approach also presents a number of difficulties, as follows: 
 The quantification of vulnerability appears to be based on a great deal of detailed design having been 
accomplished; adding survivability features appears to be an a posteriori measure. The trend in design 
of civilian aircraft is to increase discipline fidelity at earlier stages of design, to improve the quality of 
design and shorten the design cycle time. This would require for survivability to be included in the 
multidisciplinary design processes simultaneously with other disciplines. Thus, the quantification of 
survivability would require the development of physics-based models that would yield measures of 
vulnerability in terms of the design variables, objective and constraint functions in the design problem 
formulation.  
 Given the need for a higher degree of assurance for survival of each civilian aircraft carrying 
passengers, a great deal of accuracy would be needed for uncertainty quantification and propagation in 
the evaluation of vulnerability, which does not appear to be present in the vulnerability estimation in the 
military domain.  
 Given thousands of components on an aircraft, the approach to identifying critical components, damage 
modes and potential mitigation via discrete enumeration is likely to give rise to problems of very large 
dimension, whereas reducing the design space for tractability may cause missed salient failure 
conditions or promising designs.  
 
IV. A Quantification Path 
Survivability is affected by contributions from 
all disciplines. Some of the disciplines are shown 
in Figure 2. The list is not exhaustive. The 
sensory systems of the aircraft must continually 
monitor the external environment and internal 
state of the aircraft to inform the intelligent 
autonomous perception and decision making 
system, which, in turn, issues commands to the 
aircraft, to avoid a collision, weaken it, or recover 
sufficiently to deliver the passengers to the 
ground safely. The traditional disciplines are 
responsible for the actions dictated by the AI 
system to be physically implementable. In order 
to achieve this, survivability must be directly 
Figure 2. Some Multidisciplinary Contributions to 
Survivability 
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connected, through variables, objectives and constraints, with all relevant disciplines in the Multidisciplinary Design 
Optimization (MDO) process.  
We conjecture that the probabilities that comprise the definition of survivability can be decomposed all the way 
to the level of components or aggregates of components to allow for mapping the familiar disciplinary variables 
from aerodynamics, structures, control, and propulsion into models of component survivability, ultimately leading to 
an analysis, direct and inverse MDO formulations, with explicit accounting for uncertainties in the parameters of the 
problem. Once candidate problem formulations are established, sensitivity analysis should provide explicit 
sensitivity of survivability with respect to specific disciplinary parameters and technologies for enhancing 
survivability, as well as bounds of a particular discipline’s contribution to survivability. This is one of the paths 
currently under investigation.  
. 
V. Concluding Remarks 
“Assured Autonomy”12 is a term that embodies safe integration of UAS, autonomous systems, and systems under 
hybrid human-machine control into the National Airspace. Assuring autonomy involves a broad range of research 
and development activities aimed to ensure the safety of airspace for its users.  
In assuring autonomy, it is important to address two distinct components of the technical challenge: the 
controllable, cooperative component and the non-cooperative component. Detect-and-avoid technologies in 
development for cooperative autonomous traffic should mitigate non-cooperative behavior, in large part, as well. 
However, this development will take time, while non-cooperative UAS are beginning to impact the safety of the 
airspace already. Moreover, arguably, with growing density and diversity of UAS, the detect-and-avoid technologies 
of the future will not contain all non-cooperative vehicles, in principle. Hence, non-cooperative traffic will increase 
the risk of collisions for vehicles carrying humans with autonomous unmanned vehicles, ultimately degrading the 
safety of airspace, with negative consequences for the traveling public and economy.  
We claim that the explicit inclusion of survivability measures into aircraft design is necessary to prevent such 
safety degradation and to ensure access to airspace with dense autonomous traffic. The military aircraft survivability 
discipline is an excellent source of lessons learned for developing a survivability discipline for civil aviation. 
However, distinct mission goals, the different nature of aircraft design, the complexity of the processes and the 
preponderance of heuristic procedures make direct use of military survivability techniques not entirely applicable in 
the civilian domain. We are cautiously optimistic that our current work, which includes derivation of the analysis 
and design problems for survivability, will lay a foundation for a rigorous framework for infusing survivability into 
multidisciplinary design of civilian aircraft. 
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